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THE EFFECT OF WAIVERS IN FEDERAL INCOME
TAX CASES
MiCaiEL

. EMMANUEL

Problems of procedure, though often lacking the iridescense of
the substantive law, nevertheless provide numerous pitfalls for the
unwary practitioner. A client who may philosophically accept an
adverse decision in a hard-fought, well-argued case is inclined to be
somewhat less sympathetic when a meritorious cause is lost because
of a procedural blunder. This is particularly true in federal tax
matters, where success or failure is always measured in coin of the
realm. Said Judge Learned Hand, expressing sympathy for a taxpayer who discovered his mistake too late:'
".. . he who deals with the government must dot his i's and
cross his t's; and if he assumes that he may rely upon the ordinary rules which apply as between individuals, he is doomed to
disappointment."
In his dealings with the tithing citizenry, the taxgatherer too must
turn square corners. The Internal Revenue Code imposes procedural
restrictions with which he must comply and, in addition, sets a time
limitation within which he must act. While these restrictions and
limitations are for the protection and benefit of the taxpayer, the
Code expressly provides that the taxpayer may waive them when
he chooses to do so. It is with the effect of these waivers that this
article will deal.
WAIVERS OF RESTRICTIONS ON ASSESSMENT

ANI

COLLECrION

The federal income tax law proceeds on the theory of selfassessment, each taxpayer in effect assessing his own tax when he
files his return. The formal assessment of the tax occurs later when
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue signs the assessment roll in
Washington, thereby conferring authority on the local collectors
to collect the tax. In the event that a deficiency is subsequently
determined with respect to a taxpayer, the statute imposes certain
restrictions on its assessment and collection by the Government's
,Angelus Milling Co. v. Nunan, 144 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1944).

(176)
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representatives. No assessment of a deficiency may be made or
any proceeding for the collection of the tax begun until a notice
of deficiency, otherwise known as a 90-day letter, has been mailed
to the taxpayer and ninety days have expired; however, should the
taxpayer file a petition with the Tax Court within the 90-day period,
assessment and collection of the deficiency are further stayed until
the decision of the court becomes final. 2 Thus, except in certain
well-defined situations in which (1) the taxpayer expressly waives
the restrictions on assessment and collection,3 (2) an increased tax
is due because of a mathematical error appearing on the face of the
return, 4 (3) the Commissioner finds it necessary to make a jeopardy
assessment,3 or (4) the taxpayer is adjudicated a bankrupt or enters
receivership,6 a taxpayer is entitled to a statutory notice of deficiency
in the event a deficiency is asserted. Should the Commissioner fail
to mail such notice, the taxpayer may enjoin the collection of the
tax. 7

Because interest on a deficiency accrues at the rate of 6% from
the time the tax was due until it is assessed,8 the taxpayer is extended
the privilege of stopping interest by waiving the restrictions on
assessment and collection of the deficiency 0 By filing such waiver
2

NTr.REV. CODE §272(a)(1):

"If in the case of any taxpayer, the Commissioner determines that there is a
deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by this chapter, the Commissioner is
authorized to send notice of such deficiency by registered mail. Within ninety
days after such notice is mailed .. . the taxpayer may file a petition with the
Board of Tax Appeals [Tax Court] for redetermination of the deficiency. No
assessment of a deficiency in respect of the tax imposed by this chapter and no
distraint proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, begun, or prosecuted
until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the expiration of such
ninety-day period, nor, if a petition has been filed with the Board, until the
decision of the Board has become final
3
INT. BEV. CODE §272(d).
4
rr. REV. CODE §272(f).
5
irr. tEv. CODE §273.
6INT. REv. CODE §274.
7
rr. REv. CODE §272(a)(1): "Notwithstanding the provisions of section
3653(a) the making of such assessment or the beginning of such proceeding or
distraint during the time such prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court."
SINr. REv. CODE §292(a).
9INT. REv. CODE §272(d): "The taxpayer shall at any time have the right,
by a signed notice in writing filed with the Commissioner, to waive the restrictions provided in subsection (a) of this section on the assessment and collection of the whole or any part of the deficiency."
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on Treasury Form 870,10 the taxpayer permits the immediate assessment of the tax, and the running of interest stops thirty days after
the waiver is filed." Care should be exercised to prevent a taxpayer
from inadvertently waiving his appeal to the Tax Court by prematurely filing a Form 870. The issuance of a statutory notice of
deficiency or 90-day letter is a prerequisite to the Tax Court's jurisdiction of an appeal, 1 2 but upon receipt of a waiver the Commissioner is no longer under obligation to issue the deficiency notice. 13
It is generally not advisable to file a Form 870 waiver or to pay the
tax before the issuance of the statutory notice if it is desired to
subsequently file a Tax Court petition. In a recent case a taxpayer,
believing that he would shortly receive a deficiency notice, mailed
the Commissioner a check for the estimated amount of the deficiency;
he later received the notice of deficiency and appealed to the Tax
Court. The court granted the Commissioner's motion to dismiss on
grounds that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction when no deficiency
existed on the date the statutory notice was issued. 14 It is often
considered desirable to stop the running of interest by filing a Form
870 waiver before the notice of deficiency has been issued, but if
the taxpayer wishes to reserve his right of appeal to the Tax Court,
he should insert a provision on the face of the waiver making it
binding on the Commissioner to issue a deficiency notice.1 5
1OForm 870 is used in income tax cases, Forms 890 and 890A in estate tax
and gift cases respectively. Although the same general principles apply to all
three, the scope of this paper is limited to income tax matters. Form 870 is set out

in its entirety at the end of this article.
"1INT. REv. CODE §292(a). Or on the date the deficiency is assessed, whichever 2is the earlier.
1 The Monograph of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, pt. 9, Administration of Internal Revenue Laws, reprinted as Sm;.
Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 n.55 (1941) states:

"If no notice of deficiency has been sent when the waiver is signed, its

execution in effect waives the privilege of going to the Board of Tax Appeals
[Tax Court] since the jurisdiction of the Board depends upon the sending of a
deficiency notice which the waiver relieves the- Commissioner of doing."

13See note 9 supra.

14Anderson v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 841 (1948).

15G.C.M. 2010, VI-2 CuM. BULL. 85 (1927)

states that a notice in writing.

consenting to assessment, in which the taxpayer reserves the right to appeal to the

Tax Court, is sufficient to stop interest. The Senate Finance Committee Report on
the 1926 Revenue Act concerned with §272(d) included a statement that a
waiver would not affect a taxpayer's right to take his case to the Tax Court.
SEN. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926). The Conference Committee
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The words of the statute allowing a waiver "of the whole or any
part of the deficiency" 16 would appear to indicate that a taxpayer
may execute a partial waiver pertaining only to a designated portion
of a deficiency. In actual practice, however, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue has shown some disinclination to "accept" partial waivers
in spite of the absence of statutory language requiring that waivers
be accepted. It should be remembered that there is nothing final
about an ordinary Form 870 waiver; it merely stops interest and
allows assessment and collection of the deficiency. It does not preclude a taxpayer's suit for refund, 17 nor does it prohibit the Commissioner from asserting a further deficiency, even after the first
8
deficiency is assessed and paid.1
WAivERs As

Fnw,

SETrLMwnS

The Internal Revenue Code provides two methods for the final
settlement, short of litigation, of a disputed tax liability; these are:
(1) closing agreements' 9 and (2) compromises.20 Once approved
eliminated this provision as surplusage.
1 6See note 9 supra.
17
Bethea v. Scofield, 74 F. Supp. 31 (W.D. Tex. 1947).
' 8 Payson v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1948).
191NT. RBv. CODE §3760. "Closing Agreements.
"(a) Authorization. - The Commissioner (or any other officer or employee
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, including the field service, authorized in
writing by the Commissioner) is authorized to enter into an agreement in
writing with any person relating to the liability of such person (or of the
person or estate for whom he acts) in respect of any internal revenue tax for
any taxable period.
"(b) Finality. - If such agreement is approved by the Secretary, the Under
Secretary, or an Assistant Secretary, within such time as may be stated in such
agreement, or later agreed to, such agreement shall be final and conclusive,
and, except upon a showing of fraud or malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a
material fact "(1) The case shall not be reopened as to the matters agreed upon or the
agreement modified, by any officer, employee, or agent of the United
States, and
"(2) In any suit, action, or proceeding, such agreement or any determination, assessment, collection, payment, abatement, refund, or credit
made in accordance therewith shall not be annulled, modified, set
aside, or disregarded."
20
Nr. REv. CoDE §8761. "Compromises.
"(a) Authorization. - The Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, or of the Under Secretary of the Treasury, or of an Assistant Secretary of
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by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Under Secretary, or an Assistant
Secretary, these settlements are final and binding on both the taxpayer and the government as to matters agreed upon, and may be
reopened only on a showing of fraud, malfeasance or misrepresentation of a material fact. 2' Because these statutory modes of settlement are cumbersome and unwieldy, the Bureau has shown an increasing inclination to resort to informal settlement agreements,
the binding effects of which are often dubious. One manner in which
these agreements are frequently formulated is by altering the ordinary Form 870 waiver through typewritten additions and deletions
in order to reflect the terms of the settlement. In such agreements
the taxpayer is almost always asked to waive his right to sue for
a refund of the disputed tax, while the Commissioner may or may
not relinquish his right to assert a further deficiency. Although it is
clearly stated on the ordinary Form 870 that it is not a final closing
agreement under section 3760,22 this condition is often deleted when
an altered waiver, Form 870-TS, is executed. Settlements of this
type are generally executed by the Technical Staff in the pre-90-day
stage and have been variously interpreted by the courts. There is
presently an open conflict as to the effect of altered waivers in precluding refund actions by taxpayers. The problem resolves itself
into two questions: (1) Can there be a valid final settlement, binding
on both the taxpayer and the Government, short of a formal closing
agreement or a compromise? (2) What degree of mutuality is necessary to bind both parties?
The first question reached the Supreme Court in Botany Worsted
Mills v. United States, 23 in which the taxpayer had orally agreed to
the Treasury, may compromise any civil or criminal case arising under the
internal revenue laws prior to reference to the Departmest of Justice for
prosecution or defense; and the Attorney General may compromise any such
case after reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense."
21
For an outline of closing agreement procedure see Mimeograph 6383, 1949
INT. REv. BULL. No. 24 at p. 8 (1949).
22
The following is set forth at the bottom of printed Form 870:
"NOTE. - The execution and filing of this waiver at the address shown in
the accompanying letter will expedite the adjustment of your tax liability as
indicated above. It is not, however, a final closing agreement under section
3760 of the Internal Revenue Code, and does not, therefore, preclude the
assertion of a further deficiency in the manner provided by law should it
subsequently be determined that additional tax is due, nor does it extend the
statutory period of limitation for refund, assessment, or collection of the tax."
23278 U.S. 282 (1929).
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an informal settlement with the Chief of the Special Audit Section
of the Bureau. After paying the tax pursuant to the settlement, the
taxpayer subsequently brought suit to recover part of the amount
paid, over the Commissioner's objection that the settlement was a
binding contract which foreclosed a suit for refund. The Court held,
in line with the taxpayer's argument, that it was the intention of
Congress in enacting Section 376124 to prescribe the exclusive method
by which cases could be compromised, that is, only with the approval
and consent of the Secretary of the Treasury and his immediate
assistants. The Court did not feel that Congress intended to entrust
the final settlement of such matters to the informal action of subordinate officials in the Bureau. In spite of its holding, which allowed
the taxpayer to maintain his action, the Court by dictum indicated
that under some circumstances a final administrative settlement short
of a compromise or a closing agreement might be made.
ALTmm WA lvS As PRECLUDING CInAms FoB REFUND

The problem came more clearly into focus when Baldwin v.
Higgins25 arose in the second circuit. There the Commissioner disallowed a deduction and asserted a substantial deficiency. An agreement was reached settling the case for a lesser amount, and the
taxpayer signed a Form 870 which had been altered from its printed
content to the effect that he also waived his right to sue for refund.
The Government claimed that the taxpayer was estopped from
maintaining his refund action, since the Commissioner had relied
upon the agreement and allowed the statute of limitations to run.
The taxpayer leaned heavily on the Botany Mills decision in his argument that the statutory procedure governing closing agreements had
not been complied with. The district court distinguished the Botany
case on grounds that there the agreement was oral, and, further,
that Botany did not expressly waive its right to sue for refund. The
waiver was held to be a valid on6 which estopped the taxpayer from
maintaining his suit for refund. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed per curiam.
The question next arose in Joyce v. Gentsch,2 6 resulting in a clear24

Then

RE . STAT. §8229 (1875).

2587-2 U.S.T.C.

9484, 19 A.F.T.R. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 100 F.2d

405 (2d Cir. 1938).
26141 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1944).
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cut victory for the taxpayer and an open conflict between two
circuits. In the Joyce case the taxpayer claimed a loss on certain
stock which had become worthless in 1934. The Commissioner contended that the loss should have been taken in 1935, and a settlement
was reached pursuant to which the taxpayer executed and filed an
altered Form 870 wherein he waived his right to sue for a refund
but in which the Commissioner expressly reserved the right to assert a further deficiency. Two years later, after the statute of limitations had barred the assertion of any further deficiencies, the taxpayer withdrew his claim for the 1935 deduction and filed a claim for
a refund of part of the 1934 tax paid because of his failure to take
a deduction for the worthless stock in that year. The altered Form
870 waiver was placed in evidence in the district court and it was
given the effect of a binding contract. The lower court further held
that because the Commissioner had relied on the agreement until
he was barred by the statute of limitations from setting up a further
deficiency, the taxpayer was estopped from claiming a refund. The
Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court on
two grounds: First, the waiver had not been approved by the Secretary of the Treasury or his authorized representative and hence
could not be given the effect of a valid closing agreement; and
second, while the taxpayer had abandoned his right to sue for refund, the Commissioner had reserved his privilege of asserting a
further deficiency, thus rendering the agreement not binding because it lacked mutuality.
MUTUALITY AS

A NECESSARY ELEMENT

It is difficult to reconcile the Baldwin and Joyce cases because
they approached the problem from different angles. In the Joyce
case the court felt that, short of a closing agreement or a compromise, there can be no binding settlement. The two cases seem to be
in conflict despite the fact that there may be a slight distinction as
to matters in dispute not covered by the waivers. Although the
Commissioner successfully raised estoppel against the taxpayer in
the Baldwin case, it was not recognized as an effective defense to
the taxpayer's suit in the Joyce decision. The estoppel theory appears
dubious in these situations, as true estoppel cannot exist without
representations made by one party upon which another relies to
his detriment. If the problem is approached loosely on the theory
of promissory estoppel, it more nearly fits. The main difficulty in the

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss2/2
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Joyce case was the provision that the Government could assert
further deficiencies at any time, resulting in the circuit court's
holding that the waiver lacked mutuality because it was not binding on the government. Such an argument is more impressive technically than it is in practice, since 870-TS forms are executed by the
Technical Staff, whose settlements are not subject to being upset on
post-audit review. It may be argued, however, that the Technical
Staff can reverse itself. This is made difflicult by the fact that the
statute of limitations for making further assessments is different from
the statute of limitations on claiming refunds in that the taxpayer
has two years in which to claim a refund after payment of a deficiency, and this usually approaches the end of the period within
which the Commissioner may assert a further deficiency.27 It would
seem, therefore, that this possibility is largely theoretical and academic, although it is not refuted. As a practical matter, settlements
reached with the Technical Staff are rarely disturbed. In some areas,
in order to make for mutuality, the Bureau is striking out the reservation on the Form 870-TS that the Commissioner can assert a further deficiency. Partly on that ground the Joyce case is distinguished
in Guggenheim v. United States,2 8 decided in the Court of Claims.
In the Guggenheim case the taxpayer signed a Form 870-TS in
which it was expressly provided that the case would not be reopened,
or claim for refund filed or prosecuted. The portion of the form
reserving a right on the part of the Commissioner to assert a further
deficiency was deleted, and the agreement was subsequently accepted
by the Commissioner. The court was convinced that the document
was more than the usual Form 870 and gave it the effect of a formal
closing argreement. In distinguishing Joyce v. Gentsch, the court
found the mutuality which had been lacking in that case; that is, in
return for the taxpayer's promise not to reopen the case or sue for
refund the Commissioner gave up his right to assert a further deficiency. In Bank of New York o. United States29 the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit committed itself to the reasoning advanced in
the Joyce case, and so, with this equal division, the authority on the
27

IEr. REV. CODE §275(a) allows the Commissioner a flat three years after
the return is filed in which to assert a deficiency; on the other hand, §822(b)
permits a taxpayer to file a claim for refund within three years from the time the
return was filed or within two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever

is later.

2877 F. Supp. 186 (Ct. Cl. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 908 (1949).
29170 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1948).
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subject is now in square conflict.
It has been suggested that much confusion could be avoided
30
through the exercise of more initiative on the part of the taxpayer.
Certainly if a taxpayer anticipates that he may file a refund claim
he should protect himself on that score by inserting pertinent language on the face of the Form 870. In United States v. S. F. Scott
and Sons, Inc.,3 1 the First Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the taxpayer's refund action after execution of a waiver in which were
inserted the words:
"The taxpayer expressly reserves the right to appeal or file
a claim for refund, if upon further investigation it appears that
the determination of the assessment is erroneous."
A like result was obtained in the Court of Claims when the taxpayer
2
stipulated on the face of the waiver:
"This consent is signed without any admission or agreement
on the part of the taxpayer that the tax to be shown by the
assessment is correct and the taxpayer reserves in every wNay
complete rights to ask for refund, abatement or credit for all
or any part of the tax to the same extent as if this consent had
not been executed."
It should be remembered that, while these reservations were made
by the taxpayer, the Commissioner at the same time reserved the
right to assert a further deficiency. If the Commissioner should forego
his privilege with regard to the assertion of additional deficiencies,
it is doubtful that a court would find the necessary mutuality in a
waiver in which the taxpayer retained his right to sue for refund.
WAIvE.Rs OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The basic statute of limitations in income tax matters is three
years, measured from the due date of the return. 33 After that time
the Commissioner is ordinarily foreclosed from asserting a deficiency;
3OCutkin, Informal Federal Tax Settlements, 4 TAx L.

Rmv. 477, 489 (1949).
F.2d 728 (1st Cir. 1934).
H. & B. American Machine Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 48 (Ct. C1.

3169
32

1935).
33

INT. REV. CODE §275(a).
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however, if 25 % or more of gross income is omitted from a taxpayer's
return, immediate assessment may be made, or collection commenced
34
without assessment, for a period of five years. Should the tax-payer
fail to file a return or file a false return, assessment of a deficiency
may be made at any time.35 The statute further provides that the
issuance of a statutory notice of deficiency suspends the statute of
limitations for ninety days, or, if the taxpayer files a petition with
the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court becomes final
and for sixty days thereafter.3"
In order to expedite an orderly determination of a taxpayer's
liability in the initial stages of a case, and to allow time to iron out
difficulties and misunderstandings on an administrative level, the
taxpayer is extended the privilege of waiving the statute of limitations
by filing Treasury Form 872.37 Delay is often advantageous when a
favorable change in regulations or amendment to the statute is anticipated. Again, it may be that a propitious decision in a pending
suit would aid in the successful disposition of a case. In any event,
the statute of limitations is usually close upon the Commissioner's
heels, and should a taxpayer desire to keep his case in the pre-90
day stage for any substantial length of time he had best file a Form
872 waiver. A waiver of the statute of limitations does not waive
the jurisdictional deficiency notice, so, of course, the taxpayer's right
of appeal to the Tax Court is in no way affected.
It is current Bureau practice to request waivers extending the
statute of limitations for considerable lengths of time,38 and as the
workload of the Bureau increases, with a corresponding lag in the
settlement of cases in the pre-90-day stage, the extensions requested
continue to grow longer. A real danger exists, however, in those
instances in which the field audit has not been completed as the
end of the period of limitations approaches. A taxpayer confronted
with such a situation has the choice of filing a waiver of the statute
or facing the very real possibility of a jeopardy assessment. The
Code allows the Commissioner to make a jeopardy assessment if he
34

1Nr. REV. CODE §275(c).
INT. REV. CODE §276(a).
36INT. REv. CODE §277.
37
1Nr. REv. CODE §276(b).
38
The Internal Revenue Code contains no provisiois allowing waivers of the
statute of limitations in estate and gift tax cases. While this may be an advantage
with regard to the expeditious closing of estates, it frequently results in the
35

assertion of a hastily determined deficiency, often before the taxpayer has been
extended an adequate opportunity to be heard.
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believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency will be
jeopardized by delay. 39 Perhaps a primary intent of Congress in
enacting the statute was to provide an expeditious method of assessing
a deficiency in the event that a taxpayer commenced concealing
assets or started to leave the country. 40 There are holdings, however,
that if the period of limitations is about to expire and the taxpayer
refuses to extend it by filing a Form 872, the Commissioner is justified
in making a jeopardy assessment. 41 This has been said to be an
extension of legislative intent, and it may be argued that such an
interpretation in effect eliminates the statute of limitations as it was
intended to operate. As a practical matter, however, jeopardy assessments are made in only a small minority of the cases that have
come under close scrutiny. In spite of this, jeopardy assessment
procedure is not laudable in that the only justifiable inquiry is ab
to whether the Commissioner "believes" it to be necessary. While
this latitude is granted by the words of the statute itself, it amounts
42
to absolute administrative discretion.
When a jeopardy assessment is made, the taxpayer receives a
notice and demand for the tax and is allowed ten days in which
to pay it or post a bond. 43 The Commissioner is required to mail
a notice of deficiency within sixty days after the assessment is made
in order that the taxpayer may test the validity of the jeopardy
assessment in the Tax Court if he so desires. 44 This entire procedure
discriminates against those taxpayers who are so unfortunate as to
have their returns come under examination just before the expiration of the statute of limitations, for they are denied the privilege,
ordinarily available, of litigating a deficiency in the Tax Court before
paying it. It would appear that a more equitable result could be
obtained by amending the statute to authorize the immediate assessment of a deficiency but to provide for delaying the collection of
the tax while litigation is pending.
39

4

INr. REv. CODE §273(a).

OHearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess.41 81 (1926).
E.g., James Couzenz, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).
42
H.R. REP. No. 358, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1926) stated: "It should be
observed that the board and the appellate courts have no authority to examine
into the question as to whether the jeopardy determined by the commissioner in
fact exists."
43
INT. REV. CODE §273(f).
44

1NT. REV. CODE

§273(b).
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PmFIATu_ E

vEmsus TiNmLY

WAvERs

It cannot always be taken for granted that the mere filing of a
waiver will accomplish the result anticipated. Certain situations
provide vexing problems with regard to the effect and validity of
waivers, and it would appear that here, as in other phases of the
tax law, proper timing is of considerable importance. Although there
is a split of authority in the cases dealing with the timeliness of
waivers, certain rules may be drawn which are of aid to the
practitioner.
In Mutual Lumber Co. v. Poe,45 a deficiency was asserted for
the years 1920 and 1921, and the taxpayer filed a Form 872 consenting to an extension of the limitation period until December 81,
1926. On December 2, 1926, the taxpayer filed a Form 870 waiver of
restrictions on assessment and collection, thus permitting immediate
assessment of the deficiency, and at the same time the Government
requested a new Form 872 further extending the period of limitations.
Upon the taxpayer's refusal to consent to an additional extension of
the statute, the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency on December 16, 1926, and assessed the tax on March 1, 1927. The taxpayer contbnded that, although the issuance of a notice of deficiency
normally tolls the statute, the Commissioner could have assessed the
deficiency at any time after the Form 870 was filed, so the deficiency
notice was to all intents and purposes surplusage and of no effect;
being surplusage, it did not suspend the statute of limitations, and
the assessment was barred. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit determined that the right granted the taxpayer by Section
272(d) 46 to waive the restrictions on assessment and collection is
qualified by the condition specified in Section 272(a), 47 namely,
"if in the case of any taxpayer, the Commissioner determines that
there is a deficiency in respect to the tax." The court reasoned that
if there is no determination of deficiency by the Commissioner there
is no right of appeal for the taxpayer to waive, since the provisional
report of the revenue agent cannot be made the basis of an appeal.
Accordingly, the court found that the purported waiver was filed
with the Commissioner before the latter had found any deficiency,
was therefore premature, and was powerless to prevent the Coin4566 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1933).
40Revenue Act of 1926, §274(d), 44 STAT. 56 (1926).
47
Revenue Act of 1926, §274(a), 44 STAT. 55 (1926).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1950

13

Florida LawOF
Review,
Vol. 3, Iss.
2 [1950],
Art. 2
UNIVERSITY
FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEW
missioner's resort to a letter of deficiency, by which the running
of the statute was suspended.
In deciding the Mutual Lumber Co. case the circuit court failed
to give effect to, or even consider, the wording of Section 272(d),
which states: "The taxpayer shall at any time have the right . . . to
waive the restrictions . . . on assessment and collection of a whole
or any part of the deficiency." 4 8 Rather, the court relied on interpreting the words "the deficiency," which it determined to mean
the sum set forth in the 90-day letter. The Mutual Lumber case
was subsequently followed and approved by the same court in
McCarthy Co. v. Commissioner.49 In view of these two decisions
the sub-committee of the House Committee on Ways and Means
proposed amending the statute to the effect that the taxpayer should
have the right to waive the restrictions on assessment and collection
either before or after the sending of a notice of deficiency. 50 No such
amendment was adopted, and in East Bay Water Co. v. McLaughlin5'
this lack of Congressional action was interpreted as an indication
52
of legislative intent endorsing the previous decisions.
While the Mutual Lumber Co. case dealt with the effect of a
Form 870 waiver in connection with the statute of limitations, the
problem next arose with regard to its validity for purposes of
stopping interest. Nevertheless, the question was the same: whether
restrictions on assessment and collection of deficiencies may effectively be waived by a taxpayer in advance of the Commissioner's
3
determination of his liability. In Moore v. Cleveland Railway Co.5
an Internal Revenue agent audited the taxpayer's returns for several
years back, determining deficiencies in certain years and overassessments in others. The taxpayer was satisfied with the audit,
and, desiring to settle the deficiencies so as to stop the accumulation of interest, filed a waiver of restrictions on assessment and
collection. The Commissioner, notwithstanding the taxpayer's ap48

G.C.M. 2010, VI-2 Cumr. BULL. 85 (1927) states:
"These restrictions may be waived by the taxpayer 'at any time' and that
may be either before or after a petition has been filed with the Board, or even
after the Board has rendered its decision."
4980 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1935).
50
Report of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.,
pp. 53-54 (1938).
5124 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Colo. 1938).
52
See 1 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 465 (1948).
INT. REV. CODE §272(d).

53108 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1940).
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proval of the audit, and its consent to the assessment and collection
of the deficiencies, proceeded to increase the deficiencies and reduce the overassessments. At the same time he tendered a new
form of waiver, which the taxpayer did not execute, and two months
later issued a notice of deficiency. Following further negotiations,
the taxpayer paid the tax with interest to date and brought suit
for refund in the district court. The Government, following the
argument which had proved successful in the Mutual Lumber and
other Ninth Circuit cases, contended that the taxpayer's waiver,
filed before the notice of deficiency had issued, was premature and
did not operate to stop interest after thirty days. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a decision which gave full effect
to the words of the statute allowing a waiver at any time, held for
the taxpayer. The court said that even though a deficiency had
been only tentatively ascertained it could see no reason why the
waiver would not be valid to that extent so as to permit assessment
and collection to go forward with dispatch.
As between Moore v. Cleveland Railway Co. and Mutual Lumber
Co. v. Poe, the Cleveland Railway case seems to stand on the firmer
ground. As the court there pointed out, if the Congress had intended to grant the right to waive only after final determination,
it would have been very easy to have said so. Further, Section 272(d)
stipulates that a taxpayer may waive the restrictions imposed upon
the Commissioner by Section 272(a). One of these restrictionss is that
no assessment can be made until a letter of deficiency is sent. It is
submitted, therefore, that a taxpayer cannot waive this restriction
unless he does so before the issuance of a 90-day letter. The Court
of Claims,54 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,5 5 and a
district court in the Third Circuit 56 have adopted the rationale of
the Cleveland Railway case, resulting in a four-to-three division
of authority on the timeliness of Form 870 waivers.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of Section 272(d) is obviously to permit the taxpayer
to settle his tax liability and to allow the Government to get its
54Roos
55

v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 144 (Ct. CL 1940).

Associated Mutuals v. Delaney, 176 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1949).
56

Diamond Alkali Co. v. Driscoll, 40-2 U.S.T.C.

9625, 27 A.F.T.R. 1083

(W.D. Pa. 1940).
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money without delay when no controversy remains between the
taxpayer and the Commissioner. In such cases the statute offers a
substantial inducement to the taxpayer to execute the waiver. If
a waiver is of no avail until after final determination, there is little
or no inducement to waive, since only a small amount of interest
would be saved. In view of the uncertainty presently existing, it
might be desirable to file waivers at two stages in the proceedings
when the objective is to save the interest: (1) after a preliminary
determination of the deficiency incorporating a proviso making it
binding on the Commissioner to issue a 90-day letter,5 7 and (2)
after the final deficiency notice has been issued. If a single Form
870 waiver is filed during the pre-90-day stage, it would appear best
to sue for refund in the Court of Claims, which has adopted the
Cleveland Railway Co. rationale. It is likely that, with the exception
of the Ninth Circuit, the Cleveland Railway case will eventually be
accepted by the courts as the sounder doctrine.
There appears to be no uniform Bureau procedure with regard
to the tolling of the statute of limitations after a Form 870 has been
filed but before a 90-day letter has issued. Sometimes the Commissioner issues a deficiency letter and relies on the Mutual Lumber Co.
case, and on other occasions a jeopardy assessment is made. The
taxpayer should carefully weigh the advantages of filing a Form
872 consent to an extension of the period of limitations in view of
the fact that either a jeopardy assessment or a hastily computed
deficiency is apt to be "padded" in order to avoid overlooking anything. Although a taxpayer is entitled to have his taxable year
closed once and for all, it is generally best to give the Commissioner
time to accomplish this in an orderly manner.
The question of the legal efficacy of a Form 870 waiver as a means
for effecting final settlement in income tax cases is as yet unsolved.
It is disappointing that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the
Guggenheim case, allowing the current uncertainty to continue..S
Subject to the Second Circuit's holding in Baldwin v. Higgins, the
present rule appears to be that substantial mutuality must exist in
order to transform an altered Form 870 into a binding settlement
between the parties. If the taxpayer gives up his right to make a
refund claim while, at the same time, the Commissioner retains the
5t 7See note 15 supra.
5877 F. Supp. 186 (Ct. C1. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 908 (1949).
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privilege of asserting additional deficiencies, the necessary mutuality
is lacking and neither party is bound by the agreement. On the
other hand, if the taxpayer surrenders his right to claim a refund
in consideration of the Government's relinquishing its right to assert
further deficiencies, the agreement will probably be given the effect
of a binding and final settlement.
Legislation is needed to clarify this vexing situation. The answer
would appear to lie in a new and less formal procedure which would
arrive at a binding final settlement of disputed tax liabilities without
the time-consuming and burdensome process attending the execution of a compromise or a closing agreement.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1950

17

192

Florida LawOF
Review,
Vol. 3, Iss.
2 [1950],
Art. 2
REVIEW
LAW
FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY

Form 870
Treasury Department
Internal Revenue Service
(Revised June 1941)
WAIVER OF RESTRICTIONS ON ASSESSMENT
AND COLLECTION OF DEFICIENCY IN TAX
Pursuant to the provisions of section 272 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code,
and/or the corresponding provisions of prior internal revenue laws, the restrictions
provided in section 272 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, and/or the corresponding provisions of prior internal revenue laws, are hereby waived and consent is
given to the assessment and collection of the following deficiency or deficiencies
in tax:
.....--income tax in the sum of
taxable year ended
_income tax in the sum of $
-----taxable year ended
taxable year ended_--.............income tax in the sum of
(declared value) excess-profits
taxable year ended-tax in the sum of
taxable year ended-

. excess profits tax in the sum of

.

_.

taxable year ended

d

in the sum of

-

_-together with interest thereon as provided by law.
amounting to the total sum of_

(Taxpayer)
(Taxpayer)
(Address)
Date .........................-

B

y

NoTE. - The execution and filing of this waiver at the address shown in the
accompanying letter will expedite the adjustment of your tax liability as indicated
above. It is not, however, a final closing agreement under section 3760 of the
Internal Revenue Code, and does not, therefore, preclude the assertion of a further
deficiency in the manner provided by law should it subsequently be determined
that additional tax is due, nor does it extend the statutory period of limitation for
refund, assessment, or collection of the tax.
If this waiver is executed with respect to a year for which a JOINT RETURN
OF A HUSBAND AND WIFE was filed, it must be signed by both spouses,
except that one spouse may sign as the agent for the other.
Where the taxpayer is a corporation, the waiver shall be signed with the
corporate name, followed by the signature and title of such officer or officers of
the corporation as are empowered to sign for the corporation, in addition to which
the seal of the corporation must be affixed.
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